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Introduction
Viscount Castlereagh’s legacy has undergone several modifications in the years since his
death in 1822. Journalist William Anthony Hay accurately describes his reputation in the years
immediately after his death as that of “some backwoods reactionary bent on thwarting liberal
hope.”1 Percy Shelley, Castlereagh’s contemporary, described him as the embodiment of
Murder.2 Lord Byron publicly encouraged the desecration of his grave. 3 Modern depictions of
Castlereagh have been more sympathetic, choosing to emphasize his balance of power
diplomacy over any possible ideological biases. Throughout his career, he worked to ensure
British security by securing European stability. To that end, his image has gone from an antiliberal demon to a chess master, weaving together whatever values necessary to reach his goals.
Historian John Bew likens him to Robespierre. 4 William Anthony Hay describes him as the Irish
Machiavelli.5 Henry Kissinger described him as “The Insular Statesman,” a diplomat with a
realist perspective on international relations who was willing to adopt whatever position was
necessary to achieve his ultimate goal of security. 6 Castlereagh described himself as much when,
as Kissinger paraphrased, he reminded Prince Metternich that Great Britain fought in the
Napoleonic wars, “on the basis of material considerations in which British interests were
obviously involved, not because of vague enunciations of principle.” 7 However, while
Castlereagh may have claimed that he was unprincipled, his actions suggest that the modern
understanding of his diplomacy has gone too far in removing ideology from his geopolitical
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motivations. When one analyzes his motivations behind his major diplomatic affairs, the Act of
Union of 1800, the Congress of Vienna, and the State Paper of May 5 th, 1820, one will see that,
while he may not have been as principled as his peers, much of his career was motivated by a
fear of radicalism. Viscount Castlereagh did not simply want Britain to be secure in an abstract
sense, he wanted Britain to be secure from radicalism.
In this context, “radicalism” refers to political movements that threatened to upend the
traditional European order to the degree that they impacted Britain’s security. For Castlereagh,
these movements largely pertained to national governments, manifesting in the form of the
French Revolution, Napoleon, and post-Napoleonic republicanism. While each of these
movements had their differences, their common quality was this element of upheaval.
Additionally, Castlereagh’s anti-radical stance was a means to an end and not an end in and of
itself. He wanted Britain to be secure from radicalism so that it could pursue its interests, not so
Britain could be left alone on its island.
It should be noted that much of this research comes from John Bew’s biography
Castlereagh: A Life. The reason for its dominance here is that it is easily the foremost study on
Castlereagh’s life from the modern perspective. When conducting the initial research, I would
often cross-check articles and essays with Bew’s thoughts only to find that Bew’s take was more
detailed, more thoroughly researched, and gave greater context. Bew himself takes up the
modern perspective, so his influence on this thesis was more informative than argumentative.

3

Chapter 1: The Irish Destiny
Viscount Castlereagh’s first major encounter with radicalism came in the form of the
French Revolution and the effect it had on his homeland of Ireland. Much of his modern
reputation comes from how he responded to this effect. The threat of the Revolution spreading to
Ireland led Castlereagh to support British dominion over the kingdom. This support led to the
traditional perception of Castlereagh as the monster who brutalized the Rebellion of 1798 and
then sold out the kingdom to the British with the Act of Union of 1800. All of this was after
joining the pro-independence Whigs, being elected to the Irish parliament on an anti-British
platform, and working to secure the rights of the Catholic peasantry of Ireland. Presbyterian
radical Steel Dickson went so far as to cite Castlereagh’s election to the Irish Parliament a
decade prior as the direct cause for the Act of Union, saying:
…had he been rejected, on that occasion, he would never have reached that pinnacle from
which he hath fallen, at least unpitied – that Ireland would yet have been the independent,
proud, powerful, and affectionate sister of Britain… 1
The modern depiction of Castlereagh tends to emphasize his character later in the nineteenth
century, so much of this portrayal has survived into the modern day. He secured the passage of
the Act of Union by excluding an element that would give greater rights to Irish Catholics. This
element was of utmost importance to the Irish government but was undesirable to the British. By
excluding the element, Castlereagh had seemingly pulled the rug out from under his Irish allies,
so to speak, and secured a reputation for himself as the unifier of Ireland and Great Britain
among the British. However, Castlereagh did not see this as an opportunity to gain power but
instead an opportunity to defend his home from radicalism. Indeed, as the events and influence
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of Castlereagh’s early life will show, he excluded Catholic emancipation from the Act of Union
not out of a malicious fight for power but out of fear of the spread of radicalism.
At the time of Robert Stewart’s birth, Ireland was part of a dual monarchy with Great
Britain. When dealing with international politics the two acted as a single country, but
domestically they behaved as two. Ireland had its own parliament, laws, religious expectations,
and so on. Though this is not to say that Ireland and Great Britain were equal partners; Ireland
was entirely lesser to Great Britain in this relationship. In fact, this description is a little too kind
to the British. By this time, the British had drained Ireland of most of its resources and wealth,
treating it closer to a colony than a political equal. The chief executive of Ireland was known as
the Lord Lieutenant. The Lord Lieutenant was appointed by the British monarch and acted as a
viceroy. In modern terms, a viceroy is an official representative of a monarch, but it traditionally
referred to a noble who could wield royal power, as opposed to noble power, and therefore
outranked any individual who was not the monarch. The traditional distinction had lost much of
its relevance by Stewart’s day, but Stewart and his peers would have been aware of this
reputation. The Lord Lieutenant was advised by a privy council consisting of a Chief Secretary,
who acted as the head of the Parliament, an Under Secretary, who led the civil service, and three
Lord Justices, significant nobles or clergy who advised the Lord Lieutenant and occasionally led
in his stead. With the Lord Lieutenant’s position as a viceroy, the Irish government was, in
practice, controlled by the British government.
The British government also had direct control over Irish social and religious life.
Through centuries of oppression, Irish society had been stratified into the Protestant Ascendancy,
a primarily Anglican class of elites in the vicinity of Dublin, wealthy but politically weak

5

Presbyterians who lived around Ulster to the north, and Catholic peasantry. Those at the top of
Irish society were also the closest to the British and had the easiest access to power.
The circumstances of Stewart’s birth left him completely excluded from the inner circle
of Irish society. As a Presbyterian, he was excluded from the Protestant Ascendancy. While he
was born in Dublin, he grew up in Ulster, meaning he was physically separated from the heart of
Irish politics. Due to this, his only real political influence at a young age was his father. His
father was one of the few Ulster Presbyterians who was active in politics as he was the Marquess
of Londonderry. Londonderry was involved in the Irish parliament and pursued a platform of
greater independence from Britain.2 This attitude was not unexpected of someone like
Londonderry since Ulster was one of the more progressive areas of Ireland. Belfast, in particular,
was at the forefront of the Irish anti-slavery movement.3 In 1777, at the age of eight, Stewart
wrote a letter declaring his utmost support for the American Revolution, saying, “I am… a true
American.”4 It may have been a naïve support, it was support, nonetheless. At an early age, the
young Robert Stewart reflected his father’s progressive ideals.
While Stewart may have been disconnected from the Irish elites, he was deeply
connected with Presbyterian radicals. The American Revolution was popular in Ireland with
much support coming from Ulster, in particular. According to John Bew, as many as four fifths
of Ulsterians were dissenters who were frustrated that the Irish parliament was primarily
Anglican and aristocratic.5 Stewart’s father was among these dissenters and brought adolescent
Stewart to meetings with him. It was here that Stewart met with leading radicals such as Steel
Dickson. Dickson saw Stewart as a promising young radical. In his memoirs, he recounts a story
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from 1783 where he rode past Stewart’s home at Mount Stewart with a collection of men. The
fourteen year-old Stewart declared, “I would rather be at the head of such a yeomanry than be the
first lord ever a king created.”6 Admittedly, Dickson’s memoirs were published in 1812 and he
tells this story before giving a summary of Stewart’s Luciferian fall from grace. 7 Therefore,
while it is possible this story is true, it carries a curious amount of dramatic irony given Stewart’s
actions later in life and the context in which it was published. Either way, Stewart’s political
foundations were borne out of Presbyterian radicalism, not the conservative views he would
adopt later in life.
In the last decade of the eighteenth century, Robert Stewart drifted away from the radical
values of his youth and towards a more conservative philosophy. In 1790, at the age of 21, he
joined the Whig party and was elected to the Irish Parliament for his home county of Down on a
platform opposing the British government. 8 The Whigs were a party based on parliamentarian
primacy, with the Irish branch placing an emphasis on republicanism and independence from
Britain.9 Stewart drew great support from Presbyterian radicals, including Steel Dickson. 10 This
same year, the Irish Whigs hosted the largest celebration of the one-year anniversary of the
storming of the Bastille outside of France. 11 The following year, Thomas Paine published Rights
of Man. While it was popular with the majority of the Whigs, Stewart believed it had, “done
considerable mischief.” He preferred the writings of Edmund Burke and defended Burke’s
thinking at every opportunity. That is not to say that Stewart necessarily disagreed with
everything Paine had to say. He had criticisms of the ancién regime of his own and was not
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afraid to voice them. Having been presented with a variety of conflicting opinions on the
Revolution, Stewart decided to visit Paris to form his opinion from firsthand experience.
Over the course of his stay in Paris, Stewart slowly became disillusioned with the
Revolution and its ideals. He actually visited Revolutionary Paris twice, once in 1790 and once
in 1791, but for the purposes of narrative clarity these will be treated as a single visit. During this
time, the French urban centers were in a struggle between the Jacobins and the Girondins while
the rural areas to the south and the northern coast were caught up in revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence. Stewart reported to his grandfather a “scene of savage barbarity”
consisting of “indiscriminate assassination,” murder in the streets, and executions without trial,
with women and children among the victims.12 What he saw here made him want to avoid
similar violence in Ireland at all costs, writing that, “The government of Ireland I do not like, but
I prefer it to revolution.”13 This concern for revolution in Ireland may appear sudden on the
surface, but for someone like Stewart it was not an unreasonable concern. At the time, Paris was
the center of the world. The lingua franca was the French language. With the dismantling of the
French monarchy, every monarchy in the world was called into question.
Notably, Stewart saw Revolutionary France as a lost cause. He wholeheartedly believed
that France would forever be a republic, writing that France would never, “return under the
dominion of an individual.”14 At the time, there were signs that Austria and Prussia would
attempt to crush the Revolution at its source, prompting him to comment that he did not think
foreign intervention in France would be successful. He stated that the power was now in the
hands of the people and the people would never accept a foreign-installed monarch. 15 This anti-
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interventionist position was one that Stewart would come to again later in life but in this
particular instance it was grounded in the notion that once a nation had lost its monarchy it was
unrecoverable. For Stewart, once France lost its monarchs it fell into an unending whirlpool of
violence and murder.
Stewart’s fears of the Revolution spreading to Ireland would only become more real. On
February 1, 1793, Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and therefore Stewart’s
homeland. To better defend the British Isles, the Irish government disbanded their militia, the
Irish Volunteers, and reorganized it as part of the Militia of Great Britain. On April 26, Stewart
enrolled in the Militia’s branch in the county of Londonderry under the command of Thomas
Conolly, the uncle of Emily Hobart, Stewart’s future wife. 16 This was not unexpected for
someone of Stewart’s social stature, and especially not for Stewart himself due to his personal
experience with Revolutionary France.
In 1794, Robert Stewart was elected to the British House of Commons for the seat of
Tregony, Cornwall in addition to his seat in the Irish parliament. 17 Considering he, like his
father, was a supporter of Prime Minister Pitt and his pro-Irish policies, Stewart was an
opportune person to represent the desires of Ireland in this critical period. Then, in 1795, he left
the Whig party and joined their direct rivals: the Tories. While the Whigs could be considered a
general Protestant political party, the Tories were solidly Anglican. In Ireland, the Whig and proCatholic emancipation Lord Lieutenant Fitzwilliam was replaced by the pro-British Earl
Camden. The citizens of Dublin protested his arrival by rioting. 18 To assist the inexperienced
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Camden, Stewart was appointed as an advisor. 19 Soon after, in the Irish parliament, Stewart
crossed the floor and officially joined the supporters of the British government. 20
This turn was not as sudden as it may initially appear. To begin with, Stewart had already
abandoned parliamentary reform in 1793 when Irish Catholics received the right to vote, thus
enlarging constituencies to the degree that his ideal reforms were no longer tenable. 21
Furthermore, according to Historian C.J. Bartlett, Stewart and his peers were “deeply
preoccupied with the defense of Ireland, whether against French invaders or Irish rebels.” 22 In
other words, for Stewart and the British government, sacrificing respect in Ireland was worth it if
it meant the British Isles were stable and secure. Appointing a Lord Lieutenant who was known
to be loyal was a way to secure Ireland and allow the British government to give as much
attention as possible to the war with France.
In 1796, as if to punctuate his turn to the British side, his father was created Earl of
Londonderry, allowing Stewart to inherit his father’s courtesy title: Viscount Castlereagh. 23 Soon
after, his fear of the Revolution spreading to Ireland threatened to make itself realized. In the
winter of 1796, France was close to annexing the Austrian Netherlands, German Rhineland, and
Western Italian Alps, and was now setting its eyes on the British Isles. 24 The target for invasion
was Bantry Bay, Ireland. Irish discontent was reaching a breaking point, with certain groups,
such as the United Irishmen, aiming for open rebellion. The goal was for French troops to make
landfall, rendezvous with the United Irishmen, and work together to rid Ireland of British
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control. Unfortunately for the French, this plan would never come to be as bad weather left their
ships scattered and sunken.25
This failed invasion would lead Castlereagh to conclude that Ireland’s survival depended
on its unification with Great Britain. As he was both an officer in the Militia and an advisor to
the Lord Lieutenant, he was more than knowledgeable of the capabilities and weaknesses of the
Irish military. This meant that he knew that the invasion of Bantry Bay failed due to the weather,
and only due to the weather. From Castlereagh’s perspective, had the French managed to make
landfall, the Irish forces would have been unable to repel them, saying that, “The Weather has
solved the problem and saved us the hazard, but enough has pass’d to make it incumbent on this
country not the trust its safety hereafter to the Elements.” 26 More importantly, if the French tried
again, they would more than likely be successful. Note that this is entirely Castlereagh’s
assessment of the situation. The French did, in fact, successfully make landfall in Ireland during
the Rebellion of 1798 and were repelled. For Castlereagh, the Irish situation was as follows:
without greater support from Britain, Ireland would fall to the French. Castlereagh still saw the
French Revolution as meaning unending violence and suffering. Therefore, falling to the French
meant succumbing to said violence and suffering. He thought the only way Ireland could receive
the support it needed was by unifying with Great Britain and forming the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland.27 Castlereagh was not alone in this conclusion. Wolfe Tone, the leader
of the Rebellion of 1798, commented that the British government was “mad if [they do] not
attempt a Union, and the French are mad if they do not attack Ireland before it can be effected.” 28
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The Act of Union would not come about for another four years, but one might already see
how Castlereagh’s motivations for unification at this early stage differed from the traditional
portrayal. Instead of an anti-liberal desire for power, the seed of unification was planted in
Castlereagh’s mind out of a desire to protect Ireland from French invasion and by extension the
ever-spreading Revolution. The modern perspective supports this interpretation of Castlereagh’s
decision. At this point, the goal of unification had no purely selfish benefit for Castlereagh. If
anything, it would be a disadvantage. He was a minister in the British and Irish parliaments and
advisor to the Lord Lieutenant. If unification were to suddenly occur in 1796, he would lose two
of those roles with little possibility of career advancement in return.
As Wolfe Tone explained, the people of Ireland were aware that unification was on the
horizon, and many rose up against it in the Rebellion of 1798. Scholars generally define the
Rebellion as beginning on May 24, but the country was not stable before that date. Martial law
had already been declared in 1797. The goal of the rebellion was to overthrow the stratified
socio-religious system and establish an Irish Republic with the aid of the French. As such, the
rebellion was led by Presbyterian gentry and supported by Catholic peasantry. In particular, the
organization and planning were headed by the United Irishmen, who were led by Wolfe Tone. In
response to the Rebellion, the Earl of Camden was replaced as Lord Lieutenant on June 14 by
Lord Cornwallis, who had experience in combatting republican rebels after leading the British
forces in the American War of Independence thirty years prior. One of Cornwallis’s first acts as
Lord Lieutenant was to appoint Castlereagh as Chief Secretary.
During the Rebellion, Castlereagh had a personal policy of hunting the enemy leadership
while being lenient when punishing the average peasant rebel. He refused to “shut the door of

12

mercy” on the individual rebels, which gained him much criticism from the Irish Parliament. 29
However, the government Castlereagh was a leader in and representative of was not so kind.
Captured rebels were not prisoners of war, they were traitors to the Crown. Therefore, they were
punished in the only way traitors could be punished: public execution. 30 While Castlereagh
himself was lenient to rebels, his peers were not, and he received much of the blame for it.
With the Rebellion of 1798, Castlereagh had passed a point of no return. As Chief
Secretary and head of the Irish Parliament, he was the face of the government that chose to
slaughter and massacre its dissidents. He was the face of the government that sentenced Wolfe
Tone to execution. No matter what clemency Castlereagh wished to give to the rebels, he now
bore the iron fist. While Cornwallis may have been the one in charge, he was seen as British, so
his behavior towards the rebellion was to be expected. But Castlereagh was Irish, so he was the
traitor to his people. Steel Dickson, the Presbyterian radical Castlereagh had looked up to as a
child, described him in this time as, “the unblushing betrayer of his country to a foreign
Sanhedrin.”31 Bearing the responsibility of suppressing the Rebellion, he moved forward with
what he believed to be the only way to save Ireland from the Revolution: unification with
Britain.
The Rebellion of 1798 had brought centuries of British oppression to a head. The nonAnglicans of Ireland had demonstrated to the British government that the separate, stratified
model would work no longer. Not to mention that, in violently suppressing the rebels, the British
had created legions of martyrs for future generations. Modern scholars generally credit Prime
Minister Pitt and Lord Lieutenant Cornwallis with the creation of a plan to solve both problems
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at once: the Act of Union. This Act would dissolve the Irish parliament and combine it with the
British parliament, thereby unifying the two nations and giving Irish counties direct
representation in the national government at the cost of regional governance. This cost was large,
and more than just political. Unifying Ireland and Great Britain meant the death of the Kingdom
of Ireland and the death of the Irish national identity. A nation that had spent centuries suffering
at the hands of another would finally succumb to that oppressor. Just two years prior, that nation
had cried out against that fate and was silenced. Knowing what this Act would mean to the Irish
public, the Irish leadership included a key provision in the Act: Catholic emancipation. While the
Kingdom of Ireland may no longer exist, its Catholic population, its majority population, would
finally be able to voice their wants and needs at any level of government. Pitt and Cornwallis
both believed that Catholic emancipation was key to securing the Union as the Irish people
would not accept it otherwise.32
British attitudes towards Catholicism had not changed much in the three hundred years
since the foundation of Anglicanism. The British Parliament was resistant to the prospect of
Catholic emancipation and King George III was against it wholeheartedly. 33 As the role of Prime
Minister was appointed by the Crown, rumors quickly began to spread that George III was
planning to replace Pitt with the anti-emancipation Henry Addington. 34 In response to the British
resistance, the Irish leadership, and Castlereagh in particular, began a campaign of rampant
bribery to secure votes in favor of the Act. 35 Seats were bought, titles were sold, corruption
reigned supreme. In the end, however, it was not enough. Even with the bribery and trickery,
there were not enough votes in favor of the Act.
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That is, until Viscount Castlereagh made his final turn. With the fate of the Act uncertain,
Castlereagh did the unthinkable: he omitted Catholic emancipation from the bill. Since the
unfavorable element was gone, enough Members of Parliament changed their votes to get it
passed by Parliament and made official by the Crown. With the passage of the Act, the people of
Ireland had lost their national identity and gained little for it, and Castlereagh was almost singlehandedly the one to blame.
In November 1798, Castlereagh and his wife Emily were separated for some time due to
the Rebellion. Castlereagh was in Mount Stewart, which looked more like a fortress than a
manor at the time, while Emily stayed at a safe distance in Dublin. He wrote to her every day
from the 6th to the 10th, with each letter getting more impatient with their separation. On the 7 th
he wrote, “I have had no visitors and hope to escape.” 36 On the 8th he wrote, “You know that my
letters say nothing,” meaning that he was writing simply so they can communicate, not to convey
information.37 He ended his letter on the 10th by asking her, “Which of the two words, better or
worse predominates, my dearest Emily, in the Irish destiny you have chosen for yourself?” 38
Given what he had done and would do, given the circumstances he and the woman he loved were
then under, one can only wonder what he meant to imply with the term “Irish destiny.” They
loved each other dearly and, based on Castlereagh’s earlier choices of sentences, this week was
particularly hard for them. Emily was one of the only people in the world whom Castlereagh was
warm to, and in a trying time she was the person he posed this question to. For Castlereagh, the
term “Irish destiny” had no particular positive or negative connotation. After all, he was asking
Emily to fill in the blank, so to speak. However, the connotation it did have was himself. The
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Irish destiny she had chosen for herself was their marriage. When Castlereagh was writing
closest to his heart, when he was experiencing an especially difficult time in his life, Ireland was
no separate entity. He saw himself and Ireland as innately connected.
This letter is relevant here, at the Act of Union, because it was here that Ireland had died,
and Castlereagh killed it. But for Castlereagh, it was not a murder, it was a suicide, and perhaps
an accidental one at that. Castlereagh was the young man who was excluded from the inner
circle. This young man grew into a wide-eyed progressive who saw some of the worst civil
violence of the century and became disillusioned. This now-cynical adult did as was logical and
rose through government, trying to do what he saw as best to ensure that his home would not
succumb to that violence he witnessed. But as time went on his home knew what was best better
than he did. It is no surprise that Castlereagh would go on to adopt a motto from the Duke of
Wellington: “I will not do what will please the people of England. I will endeavor to do what is
good for them.”39 He sought to use the Act of Union to save his home from radicalism and in
doing so culminated a centuries-long era of oppression
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Chapter 2: The Viennese Waltz
While Viscount Castlereagh certainly impacted the world stage with the Act of Union of
1800, his most renowned diplomatic affair was the Congress of Vienna. It was here that he
worked closely with Prince Metternich of Austria to establish the Concert of Europe, a
predecessor to modern collective security systems and a primary inspiration for the League of
Nations and United Nations. Much like the Act of Union, Castlereagh’s diplomacy at the
Congress of Vienna was primarily influenced by his fear of radicalism, as seen in how he
differed from his mentor Pitt and how he approached the issues of Prussian and Russian
expansionism.
The modern and traditional perspectives on Castlereagh differ in focus in their depiction
of him at the Congress of Vienna. At the time, he was depicted in political cartoons alongside his
counterparts in Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France. Any opinion of Castlereagh at Congress was
most often a reflection of an opinion of the Congress itself. If one held the Congress in high
regard for bringing peace, then Castlereagh was one of the great peacemakers. If one disliked the
Congress’s installation of conservative monarchies, then Castlereagh was the same anti-liberal
demon he was in 1800. Contemporary cartoonist George Cruikshank mocked the Congress as
tedious and self-centered by portraying the diplomats as collapsing in fear in the face of
Napoleon’s return in the War of the Seventh Coalition. 1 In the modern day, opinions of
Castlereagh at the Congress are most often directed at his balance of power diplomacy. The
Congress is the source of the image of Castlereagh as the chess master weighing the costs and
benefits of different diplomatic decisions.
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Between 1800 and 1815, the driving theme behind Castlereagh’s diplomacy was
international cooperation and mediation. It began in 1802 with Castlereagh’s appointment as
President of the Board of Control, wherein he oversaw the East India Company and acted as the
chief official for Indian affairs in London. In this role, he mediated disputes between Richard
Wellesley, the Governor-General of India, and the directors of the East India Company. Given
that Castlereagh outranked both sides, it is notable that he opted to act as mediator rather than
declare a correct side. In July 1805, Prime Minister Pitt appointed Castlereagh as Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies, but he only held the position for half a year. Pitt passed away on
January 23, 1806 and Castlereagh ended his tenure in the cabinet less than a month later. The
Duke of Portland reappointed Castlereagh as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies in 1807
where he subsequently acted as the arm of the British government in the war against Napoleon.
During this time, Castlereagh adopted a big picture approach to international relations with
regard to the war effort. This approach is best illustrated by his infamous affair with Foreign
Secretary George Canning.
In 1809, Britain was focusing its efforts on what was known as the Peninsular War, a
campaign to free Spain from Napoleonic rule. The situation was rapidly deteriorating, and the
British forces required a change in leadership if they were to change the tide. Castlereagh
suggested the relatively inexperienced though promising Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke
of Wellington, for the role.2 The Prime Minister agreed with Castlereagh and appointed
Wellesley. Wellesley played his part splendidly and reinvigorated the Peninsular War, thus
proving Castlereagh’s intuition. Later that year, Vienna fell to the French forces, and the
Austrians required immediate assistance if their empire were to be saved. There was much
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debate in the cabinet on what was to be done, with Castlereagh becoming a leading voice behind
a proposed invasion of the Netherlands, known as the Walcheren Campaign, to destroy the
French fleet and relieve the Austrian military.3 Canning, on the other hand, was one of its leading
critics. Ultimately, they went through with the invasion and Canning’s intuition proved greater as
it ended in disaster. The invading British were plagued by literal plague as upwards of twelve
thousand of the total forty thousand soldiers fell ill, with only one hundred and six of the four
thousand deaths being due to combat. 4 The situation was only made worse when the British
troops were relocated back to the Peninsular War and spread the disease there.
A failure on such a scale led to brutal arguments in the cabinet, splitting it in two.
Castlereagh led the defenders of the Campaign while Canning led its critics. After months of
arguments, Castlereagh learned that the Prime Minister and Canning were planning to replace
him with Wellesley, who was unaware of the plot. 5 Greatly offended, Castlereagh challenged
Canning to a duel on Putney Heath. Outside of one or two apocryphal stories from his youth, this
was the only duel that Castlereagh ever took part in. Castlereagh had been a soldier and Canning
had never fired a gun. Castlereagh shot Canning in the thigh and was declared the victor. While
both men survived the encounter, their reputations were scorned. The fact that two members of
the cabinet resorted to violence to solve their issues was a disgrace to the government. Both men
resigned as a result.
The conflict between Castlereagh and Canning was borne from their different
perspectives on international relations. One can see the basics of Castlereagh balance of power
philosophy in this affair – he believed that Austria was suffering too much weight and needed to
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be relieved by the Walcheren campaign. Canning was detail-oriented and saw that, no matter the
motivation behind the campaign, the specifics of the matter made the plan untenable. Canning
saw Britain as the main character of Europe, so to speak, while Castlereagh saw it as one piece
among many.
Castlereagh’s big picture philosophy and mediatorial skills became intertwined in 1814
with the beginnings of treaty negotiations. In February and March, he played a key role in the
creation of an alliance between Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia in the Treaty of Chaumont.
This alliance was meant to bring the signing powers into a closer alliance in case Napoleon
rejected recently issued peace terms. The Treaty also set the expectation that France’s borders
would be reset to their pre-revolutionary locations after Napoleon’s defeat. These borders were
ratified with the subsequent Treaty of Paris, which Castlereagh also negotiated on behalf of
Britain. This treaty also acted as a kind of rough draft for the Congress of Vienna as it set up
several ideas that were to be discussed at the Congress, such as the concept of reorganizing the
German States into an undefined federation.
The powers of the Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Paris would go on to be the
central members of the Congress of Vienna. While many nations were represented in Vienna, the
principal diplomats were Prince Talleyrand of France, Tsar Alexander of Russia, Prince
Metternich of Austria, Prince Hardenburg of Prussia, and, of course, Viscount Castlereagh of the
United Kingdom. Talleyrand’s goal was French stability within the continent. As France had
been the aggressor in the preceding twenty-five years of war, it was at risk of being severely
punished. Talleyrand had needed to fight for a seat at the table in Vienna, so to speak, and was
not ready to stop fighting here.6 He also had the notable trait of having been in the French
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government under the Bourbons, the Republic, Napoleon, and the reinstalled Bourbons, so he
was an accomplished statesman and ideologically flexible. Metternich had similar goals, but for
Austria. With the end of the war in 1814, there was a power vacuum in Germany that Metternich
sought to fill with renewed Austrian dominance. However, he would be challenged by Tsar
Alexander and Prince Hardenburg.
Tsar Alexander went to Vienna hoping to project Russia’s power westward, namely by
forming a personal union with the Kingdom of Poland. 7 This meant that, while Poland would be
separate from Russia on paper, Alexander would rule both. Hardenburg hoped to use the
Congress to continue Prussia’s increase in size and power, challenging Austria as the primary
German power.8 He aimed to forward this goal at Vienna through a complete annexation of the
Kingdom of Saxony, which had formed an alliance with Napoleon during the wars.
Lastly, Viscount Castlereagh’s goal was three simple words: balance of power. No matter
the outcome of the diplomacy of the continental powers, Castlereagh went to Vienna with the
aim that the Congress would end in such a state that no one country could wage war without
being overwhelmed by the rest. 9 Much like how he supported the Act of Union of 1800 to ensure
Irish security, he went to Vienna prepared to guarantee British security.
Given that Prince Hardenburg and Tsar Alexander both desired expansion despite the
Napoleonic Wars, one might assume that there was a major difference in their experiences with
Napoleon that led to these different perspectives, but this was not the case. In fact, every major
diplomat at the Congress of Vienna suffered at the hands of Napoleon. 10 Castlereagh served in
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the Irish Militia and fought against the resulting Irish Rebellion. Talleyrand was exiled from
France by Napoleon under threat of death. Metternich was forced to evacuate Vienna when it
was put under siege. Tsar Alexander put large swaths of Russian land to the torch, including the
capital city of Moscow, to prevent Napoleon from seizing it. Hardenburg was in the direct path
of Napoleon’s eastward expansion. All five of them had deeply personal motivations for securing
European peace and preventing the rise of another Napoleon, but Alexander and Hardenburg
desired expansion.
This desire for peace was bolstered by the fact that every diplomat who went to Vienna
lacked a significant diplomatic tool: war. In the modern day, war is a worst-case scenario, a
failure of diplomacy. In these times, war was just another tactic diplomats could use to achieve
their goals. It was a costly, deadly, inefficient tool, but a tool, nonetheless. However, the powers
represented at the Congress had been at war for the better part of twenty-five years and had
therefore exhausted most of their resources. The United Kingdom in particular was still at war
with the United States for most of the Congress. While certain countries would ultimately
threaten war, the nations represented at the Congress were exhausted by decades of it and sought
to create a stable peace.
Castlereagh stood apart from his peers in Vienna. While the goals of the other major
players were centered around the relationship between themselves and the other powers,
Castlereagh’s goal of a balance of power was grounded in the relationships of the other powers
among each other. This dynamic is often referred to as Castlereagh having the role of a
mediator.11 The use of the term “mediator” reflects the fact that, whether or not he succeeded in
this role, Castlereagh, and by extension Britain, would be substantially less affected by the
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consequences of the Congress than the other powers. This was because of the simple fact that the
United Kingdom was on an island and the other powers were not. If, by some highly unlikely
circumstance, the Congress were to end with Prussia being given all of Germany and the
Netherlands, they might think to use their newfound resources to wage war with the rest of
Europe as a new Napoleon. Should this occur, France, Austria, and Russia would have had to
worry about invasion and how it would affect their overland trade routes and whether they would
be able to communicate with their allies and so on and so forth. Meanwhile, as demonstrated
during the Napoleonic Wars, Britain could focus its effort on the security of channel ports and
not on a continent-spanning land border.
With this perspective in mind, one must look to the ideas that Castlereagh brought to
Vienna. There is a popular idea that Castlereagh’s work at Vienna was but a vessel for the
ideology of his mentor Pitt the Younger. Henry Kissinger describes it quite effectively in A
World Restored, so that will be paraphrased here.12 In short, the geopolitical situation of 1814
bore significant similarities to that of 1804, when peace negotiations for the War of the Second
Coalition were occurring. Pitt, who was Prime Minister at the time, collaborated with Tsar
Alexander to create a plan grounded in three objectives. First, to reset the borders of France to
their extent prior to the Revolution by freeing the conquered land as independent states. Second,
organize the newly freed countries as a wall of buffer states to protect against any future French
invasions. Third, to create what would today be called a collective security system among the
countries of Europe to enforce “public law.” As Kissinger writes, this plan, “became the
blueprint of Castlereagh’s policy. So successful was he to be in achieving its goals that in 1815
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he could lay the Pitt Plan before the House of Commons as the justification of the Vienna
settlement.”
The similarities between Pitt’s thoughts in 1804 and the ultimate settlement a decade later
are remarkable. The first objective was complete to the letter. The second could arguably be seen
in the form of the German Confederation. It was not a single state, but an organized system of
minor states that had the capacity to act as a cushion for France. Finally, the third objective was
seen in the Concert System, the balance of power that Castlereagh aimed to create.
However, to say that Castlereagh simply put forward the ideas invented by Pitt with no
thoughts of his own ignores the reasons why Castlereagh continued Pitt’s ideas. To begin with, it
was simply a good plan. As history shows, it prevented war among the European powers for
forty years, until the Crimean War, and large-scale war on European soil for a century, until the
First World War. It would have been spectacularly out of character for Castlereagh to reject the
plan in its entirety just to break from the teachings of his mentor. Given this relationship, it
would be more surprising if Castlereagh’s diplomacy did not reflect Pitt’s at all. There is also the
simple fact that the Pitt Plan reflected Castlereagh’s ideas to begin with because he helped write
it. As Castlereagh was the closest to Pitt out of the Pittites, and especially during Pitt’s final
months, the two of them personally talked over the details of the Plan before it was written. 13
The Pitt Plan only affected the final outcome of the Congress. It did not affect the PolishSaxon Crisis, the specifics of the Austro-Prussian alliance, or Castlereagh’s thoughts on the
legitimacy of the Bourbon dynasty. While it could be argued that the Polish-Saxon Crisis and the
Austro-Prussian alliance were both influenced by the ultimate goal of a balance of power, the
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specifics of either issue were entirely up to Castlereagh to decide. His diplomacy was a vessel for
Pitt’s in the same capacity that the ideas of any student reflect those of their mentor.
Everything that has been discussed about the Congress of Vienna so far is logical in a
geopolitical context and seemingly free from any existential fear of radicalism. This is because
this is but the skeleton of the Congress, so to speak. When one looks to the details of the
discussions of the Congress and how they differed from Castlereagh’s preparations, the evidence
of an ongoing fear of radicalism becomes clear.
One must first look to Castlereagh’s interest in Prussian expansionism. As part of the
Paris Peace Treaty of 1814, the German states were to be “joined in a federal union,” but the
specifics of this union had yet to be ascertained. 14 In a letter to the Duke of Wellington,
Castlereagh described his two ideas for what was to be done with Germany:
Two alternatives alone [present] themselves for consideration – a union of the two great
German Powers, supported by Great Britain, and thus combining the minor States of
Germany, together with Holland, in an intermediary system between Russia and France –
or a union of Austria, France, and the southern States against the northern Powers, with
Russia and Prussia in close alliance.15
Within this same letter, Castlereagh went over the flaws of the idea of an Austro-Franco-German
alliance. His primary concern with the idea was the fact that Austria and France had historically
been rivals. He concluded the letter with the sentiment that he preferred the idea of an AustroPrussian alliance as a solution for Germany. However, this idea had many of the same flaws as
the Austro-Franco-German alliance. Notably, while Austria and Prussia were not strictly
rivalling each other to the same capacity as Austria and France, they were certainly competitors.
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While their competition would not reach its climax for another fifty years, the two states were
vying for control of Germany. Austria was the historic German power, having led the Holy
Roman Empire for the previous four hundred years. Meanwhile, Prussia had been progressively
increasing its power and influence for the prior century, slowly becoming a prominent European
power outside of the realm of Germany.
This difference between the old leader and the up-and-coming rookie, so to speak, was
reflected in their diplomatic goals during this period. As Kurt Reinhardt writes:
…as far as common partnership in the ‘German Confederation’ was concerned, the
interests of Prussia and Austria were not identical but contradictory. While Austria’s
interests lay largely outside the Germanies, in Italy, in Galicia, in the Balkans, and in the
Adriatic region, Prussia’s interests in all important issues were in harmony with those of
the minor German states.16
Austria saw Germany as being securely in their realm, so they focused on weaker areas for
expansion. Prussia could only look to the rest of Germany for expansion, due to being bordered
by Russia to the east and Austria to the south. If the two were in an alliance, then Prussia could
not expand without impacting the interests of their primary ally. This difference in perspective is
the reason that the Austro-Prussian alliance would have failed. Based on the wording Castlereagh
used in this letter, this alliance would have been sold, so to speak, to the affected parties as an
equal partnership. However, because Austria was the only one that could freely expand it was the
more favored party.
These weaknesses existed in Castlereagh’s plans for the German States because they
were not intended to be equitable alliances but to curb Prussian expansionism. Within this letter,
he spoke of the need to keep Prussia “within due bounds” and that “it was difficult to found a
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satisfactory system of balance in Europe, unless Prussia could be induced to take a part.” 17 A
realized Austro-Prussian alliance would have favored Austrian policy, but an Austro-FrancoGerman alliance would have limited Prussia as well. While expanding under the Austro-Prussian
alliance would have, at worst, left Prussia alone on the diplomatic stage, attempting expansion
while Austria was in an alliance with both France and the southern German states would have
triggered a much larger and more costly war than was arguably worth the territory Prussia
desired. In this scenario, Prussia would have been in an alliance with Russia, which may initially
appear to be a benefit until one considers that Prussia would be reliant on Russian availability. If,
for any diplomatic, economic, or geopolitical reason Russia was unable or unwilling to support
Prussian expansion then there was nothing Prussia could do.
Castlereagh’s Prussia-centric organization of Germany was a major break from Pitt’s
France-centric plan. Pitt desired that Germany be reorganized with the intention of preventing
French expansion. Both of Castlereagh’s plans would have accomplished that goal – France
could not have expanded into Germany without angering both Prussia and Austria in either
scenario – but that was explicitly a side effect, not the primary intention, of the plan. Castlereagh
even makes specific reference to French expansion being of lesser issue than German, saying
that “France need never dread a German league: it is in its nature inoffensive, and there is no
reason to fear that the union of Austria and Prussia will be such as to endanger the liberty of
other States.”18 He would not have commented on the possibility of danger to France if it were
the more threatening party. The Pitt Plan does not specifically mention curtailing Prussian
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expansion, the closest it comes is in the collective security system, but curtailing Prussian
expansionism was a primary motivator for Castlereagh with regards to the German states.
While Castlereagh was certainly worried about Prussian expansionism, it was not nearly
as big of an issue as Russian expansionism, which appeared at Vienna in the form of the PolishSaxon Crisis. Tsar Alexander’s and Hardenburg’s desires for expansion came into conflict with
Metternich’s dreams of security as their claims on Poland and Saxony, if realized, would form
borders between their countries and Austria. Castlereagh went to Vienna hoping to curtail
Prussia in favor of Austria. Therefore, opposing Alexander’s and Hardenburg’s claims to both
Poland and Saxony was most in line with Castlereagh’s goal of establishing a balance of power.
Two sides quickly developed: Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand on one side and
Hardenburg and Alexander on the other, with the former side creating a formal alliance, known
as the Secret Alliance, among their countries in the event of war.
The Secret Alliance was a curious course of action for Castlereagh. While Metternich and
Talleyrand were open to the alliance due to the Russo-Prussian threat, the British Parliament and
Cabinet would not have agreed to it had they been given an opportunity to vote on it. 19
Additionally, the British government was willing to sacrifice Poland if it guaranteed Saxon
independence.20 Castlereagh was strictly against allowing Tsar Alexander to rule Poland, stating
that such an outcome would not sate the Tsar’s hunger for conquest, instead encouraging it.
Castlereagh considered Tsar Alexander to be part of a special class of ruler whose desires must
have been curtailed. He was willing do disregard the desires of Parliament if it meant that
Alexander’s goals would be limited.
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Castlereagh held a similar attitude to another contemporary emperor: Napoleon. He
believed that Russia and Tsar Alexander had the greatest capacity to become the next
Revolutionary France and Napoleon. This exceptional attitude can also be seen in the similarities
between Castlereagh’s opinions on the Bourbon dynasty and those on Russia. When he visited
Paris in 1791, Castlereagh argued that France would never again have a monarch, citing that
power was derived from the will of the people and the people had rejected the monarchy as an
institution.21 While he was incorrect in his prediction, he maintained his argument that the
Bourbon dynasty had lost its legitimacy due to the French Revolution. When Napoleon escaped
from Elba and began the War of the Seventh Coalition, the allied nations declared their
intentions to oppose him, citing the need to reinstall the legitimate Bourbon dynasty. While
Castlereagh supported the defeat of Napoleon and the reinstallation of the monarchy, he did not
want the French monarch to be a Bourbon. He did not support Napoleon because Bonaparte was
“incompatible with the Peace and Security of Europe.” 22 However, he did not support the
Bourbons because they did not have “adequate national support.” 23 This is a curious opinion
because, as contemporary parliamentarians such as Samuel Whitbread noted, at that time the will
of the people supported Napoleon, as they had welcomed him back into Paris with open arms. 24
Castlereagh held a double standard between what he saw as legitimate and radical forms of
government. He was against Napoleon and the French Republic due to their radical nature, no
matter their public support, but he was against the Bourbons because of their lack of public
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support. As Castlereagh himself phrased it when defending the settlement regarding Genoa, “the
prejudices of a people were entitled to attention when greater objects did not stand in the way.” 25
Castlereagh’s worries about similarities between Alexander and Napoleon extended to his
views towards Russia. This idea is best reflected in the personal reflections of Castlereagh’s
brother Charles, who was both ambassador to Austria and a Lieutenant General at the time.
According to John Bew, this writing is indicative of Castlereagh’s views on Russia and Tsar
Alexander. Charles wrote that:
If we consider the power of Russia, unassailable as she is in flank and rear, hovering over
Europe with an immense front, …, with forty million hardy, docile, brave, enthusiastic,
and submissive inhabitants, with immense armies, highly disciplined, excellently
appointed; her innumerable hordes of desolating cavalry; her adoption of the French
maxims of war…26
After this point, Charles further restates his fears of the Russian military in colorful language, but
it is here that he stated his specific fears. In short, Charles sees Russia as a country that was
difficult to invade due to its position on the edge of Europe and had a large, loyal citizenry with
an excellent army to match. Castlereagh had spent the previous decade and a half battling
France, a country that was difficult to invade, as he learned firsthand with the Walcheren
Campaign, and had a large, loyal citizenry with an excellent army to match.
The loyalty element, what Charles polemically refers to as submissive, was of particular
worry. Much of what made the French army of the Napoleonic period so successful was that its
soldiers did not fight out of pay but out of loyalty to the ideals of their nation. Any rival army
with similar loyalty was rightfully of worry to the Stewarts. When Charles mentioned the
“French maxims of war” he was likely referring to Napoleon’s maxims of war. These were the
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basic principles that Napoleon used when devising military strategy and discuss terrain,
marching, and general awareness as a military leader. 27 While these were not social principles,
the prospect of Tsar Alexander adopting any element of Napoleon’s regime was cause for alarm,
as seen in how Charles equated it in threat to having a large, disciplined military.
Tsar Alexander, moreover, had been in an alliance with Napoleon from 1807 to 1812 and
actively fought against Britain during this period. 28 Alexander had also maintained his friendly
relations with Napoleon by allowing him to keep his title of Emperor while exiled on Elba. 29 No
matter the reasons that Tsar Alexander was a deciding party at the Congress of Vienna, there was
a precedent for his becoming the next Napoleon in the most literal sense.
Ultimately, the diplomatic dance of the Congress of Vienna required Castlereagh to
compromise and sacrifice some of his demands to reach an agreement. While France’s borders
were returned to their 1792 boundary, a Bourbon king was installed as monarch. The PolishSaxon Crisis ended with Prussia receiving three-fifths of Saxony and Alexander becoming King
of Poland, albeit a smaller Poland than he initially desired. The German Confederation had
similarities to Castlereagh’s plans for Germany, but it is impossible to say whether Castlereagh’s
plans would have been more successful in preventing Prussian expansion later in the nineteenth
century.
Castlereagh saw Prussia and Russia as the possible sources for a new era of radicalism in
Europe. Not only did they desire expansion, they risked upending the systems of Europe that had
only just been reinstated. As seen in a resolve that he rarely demonstrated, he was driven by his
fear of radicalism to do everything he could to limit their expansion lest they only hunger more

27

James G. Gregory, Napoleon’s Maxims of War (New York: C. A. Alvord, 1861).
Bew, A Life, 224.
29
Bew, A Life, 355.
28

31

for conquest. While he may have ultimately needed to compromise on his desires to secure an
agreement, it was this fear that drove his approach to the specific crises of the Congress of
Vienna and its outcome.
The Congress of Vienna would go on to succeed in its lofty goal of securing a lasting,
stable peace in Europe. War among the major powers would not occur for another forty years
until the Crimean War, and it would not happen among several powers on the continent until the
First World War a hundred years later. The threat of radicalism so too subsided in the years
immediately after the Congress, but as a sailor’s behavior is shaped by the coming and going of
the tide, Castlereagh’s diplomacy would be shaped by the coming and going of radicalism in
continental Europe, as seen in the events surrounding the State Paper of May 5 th, 1820.

32

Chapter 3: The Radical Tide
After the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh maintained a noninterventionist foreign
policy. As had been the case up to this point, he desired British security and the needs of the
period deemed nonintervention as the most effective way to ensure it. With the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, international cooperation was no longer a necessity for survival, so
Castlereagh adopted a perspective like that of his former rival Canning and saw Britain as the
main character of Europe, so to speak. Additionally, unlike his peers in Austria, Russia, and
Prussia, Castlereagh was unwilling to stamp out foreign radical movements purely due to their
existence. While he may have disliked foreign radical movements, he believed direct action was
only necessary when Britain itself was threatened. However, while he may have consistently
pushed for nonintervention, the arguments he gave for it changed from 1818 to 1821. Even
though the policy remained the same, his arguments and motivations for the policy reflected the
fading and growing presence of radical movements in Europe. This change in motivation is most
evident when one analyzes the situation surrounding the State Paper of May 5 th, 1820.
The modern perspective on Castlereagh emphasizes the State Paper as his most
significant diplomatic statement of the post-Napoleonic period, and possibly of his entire career.
It instituted a policy of European noninterventionism, confirming it as the default position of the
British government and making the policy articulated at the Congress of Vienna permanent. The
traditional perspective on this period instead focuses on Castlereagh’s reaction to the Peterloo
Massacre of 1819, highlighting the government’s repressive response as indicative of
Castlereagh’s anti-liberal nature. These events are actually connected in how Castlereagh’s
attitude towards both reflect his attitude towards radicalism in this period. In a shift from the fear
of radicalism that had previously motivated his diplomacy in the Act of Union in 1800 and the
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Congress of Vienna in 1815, the State Paper was primarily influenced by the geopolitical
situation surrounding its writing. However, this would only be a momentary shift as this fear
would return in the following year. Changing domestic positions towards public opinion,
evolving attitudes about republican revolutions in Europe, and the spread of noninterventionist
thinking in the British cabinet all served as major inspirations for the State Paper.
Since 1815, Europe had been quite successful at not going to war. The Concert System,
while beginning to falter, had been working effectively to organize regular consultations among
the major powers. The Secret Alliance that Castlereagh had established with Austria and France
at the Congress of Vienna had flowered into the Quintuple Alliance in 1818 with the additions of
Prussia and Russia at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, thus broadening Europe’s collective
security. What Castlereagh would define as radicalism had subsided from the European
continent, in many ways due to the work that had been accomplished at the Congress of Vienna.
There had been republican revolutions in South America and domestic political unrest in
European countries, all of which will be discussed later, but for the most part Europe was the
most stable it had been in decades. However, all good things must come to an end, and by May
1820 they had indeed ended.
The State Paper of May 5th, 1820 was issued in direct response to a republican revolution
in Spain. The other members of the Quintuple Alliance were divided over whether they should
intervene with a military presence, with France being the most in favor of intervention.
Castlereagh opposed France and instituted noninterventionism as official policy. His major
justifications were not based on principle but the situation within Spain at that time. In his
opinion, the Spanish people were unlikely to invade other nations as the French had when their
revolution was successful. Additionally, he noted that no Spanish government had listened to the
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Alliance’s advice in the past, so their intervention would just worsen an already volatile
situation. He then shifted to discussing the reasons for the Alliance’s existence by remarking that
it was created to defeat Napoleon and that it had succeeded in that goal. Castlereagh also noted
that he believed the Alliance was not meant to be an international government or peacekeeper.
Then, for the first major time in his diplomatic career, Castlereagh cited public opinion as a
cause for his foreign policy. He wrote:
It is not merely the temporary inconvenience produced to the British Government by
being so committed, …, but is the exposing ourselves to have the public Mind soured by
the effects of a meddling policy, when it can tend to nothing really effectual, and pledged
perhaps, beforehand against any exertion whatever in Continental Affairs; the fatal
effects of such a false Step might be irreparable when the moment at which we might be
indispensably called upon by Duty and Interest to take a part should arise. 1
While Castlereagh previously disregarded public opinion when constructing the Act of Union
and at the Congress of Vienna, it had suddenly become such an issue in 1820 that he explicitly
cited it within this document. This interest in public opinion was not unique to the situation in
Spain. In February 1820, Castlereagh had gone so far as to criticize the policies of Pitt, who he
previously emulated at the Congress of Vienna, by privately saying that Britain was, “weakened
for the first ten years of the War by a divided schism of publick [sic] opinion.” 2
The cause for this sudden interest in public opinion supportive of British government
policy was the Peterloo Massacre. On August 16, 1819, sixty thousand people gathered in
Manchester to peacefully protest in support of parliamentary reform. In response, the
government ordered a cavalry charge into the crowd, killing eleven protestors and injuring
hundreds of men, women, and children. 3 The Massacre quickly entered the public consciousness
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as a symbol of tyranny. It inspired Percy Shelley to write The Masque of Anarchy, a poem
wherein he described each member of the cabinet as the mask of a tool of a tyrannical
government.4 Castlereagh was the mask of Murder. Additionally, the violent response to the
protest in Peterloo spawned yet more protests across the north of England.
In response to these wider protests, Home Secretary Henry Addington introduced the Six
Acts to Parliament. These were the Training Prevention Act, the Seizure of Arms Act, the
Misdemeanors Act, the Seditious Meetings Act, the Blasphemous and Seditious Libels Act, and
the Newspaper and Stamp Duties Act. Together, they banned unauthorized military drilling,
allowed magistrates to search private property for weapons, reduced opportunities for bail,
required state permission for meetings of larger than fifty people, and increased the severity of
punishments for seditious newspapers and personal writings. As of April 2021, only three of the
Acts had been repealed. The Seizure of Arms Act elapsed after twenty-seven months and the
Seditious Meetings Act was repealed in 1825. 5 The Training Prevention Act was only repealed in
2008.6 All of these Acts became infamous soon after their passage.
For Castlereagh personally, one of the greatest consequences of the Peterloo Massacre
and the Six Acts was the Cato Street Conspiracy, a plot to assassinate every member of the
cabinet as revenge for these controversies. Ultimately, the plan was foiled by a police informant
and thirteen people were arrested. Despite its failure, the Cato Street Conspiracy is indicative of
the general unrest in response to the Massacre and the Acts, especially considering that, to this
day, the true size of the Conspiracy remains unknown. The executions of five of the conspirators
took place just four days before the State Paper was issued. Together, the Peterloo Massacre, the
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Six Acts, and the Cato Street Conspiracy demonstrated to Castlereagh that if he wanted a
diplomatic action to be successful without risking his life, he needed public support.
This realization of Castlereagh’s is of particular note because it was not his first
encounter with controversy. Both the Act of Union and his duel with George Canning directly
led to his resignation from office. The former also resulted in violent conflict in the form of the
Irish Rebellion of 1803. On a visit to Ireland with George IV in 1821, one of Castlereagh’s peers
remarked that the only reason an angry mob had not broken out at their arrival was because the
Irish did not know that Viscount Castlereagh and Lord Londonderry were the same person. 7 By
that time, Castlereagh’s father had passed away, allowing Castlereagh to inherit the Marquessate
of Londonderry. Even the Congress of Vienna was not exempt from controversy. While that
controversy was not of the same scale as these other events, Castlereagh’s focus on alliancebuilding and abolitionism earned him a certain degree of enmity from some of his peers, such as
Samuel Whitbread. Castlereagh actually considered resigning from government in late 1819,
citing the stress from the “severe labors” of parliamentary life. 8
While Castlereagh did not take personal responsibility for the Massacre and the Acts as
he had the Act of Union and the duel, the controversy certainly colored his subsequent
diplomacy. Outside of citing public opinion when instituting noninterventionism, Castlereagh
became wary about recognizing the repressive measures of his allies. In December 1819, Prince
Metternich instituted the Carlsbad Decrees in the German Confederation. The Decrees were a set
of repressive policies designed to limit what was considered seditious thought and were similar
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in nature to the Six Acts. Castlereagh notably refused to approve of the Decrees publicly, though
he did give Metternich his support privately.9
Castlereagh’s newfound regard for public opinion also marks a great shift in his attitude
towards radicalism. He previously showed great resolve when fighting against what he saw as
radicalism. When he challenged Russian expansionism and Napoleon’s legitimacy, he was more
than willing to disregard whatever value or instruction was necessary to achieve his goal of
curbing radicalism in 1815. However, by focusing on domestic issues regarding public opinion,
he showed no such resolve in 1820.
This shift was also because the political makeup of Europe had changed since 1815. Prior
to 1815, republican revolutions were a direct threat to European diplomats and Castlereagh in
particular. Then, at the Congress of Vienna, the institution of the Concert System was developed
to prevent future continental wars from occurring. Shortly after the Congress, the Holy Alliance
was formed among the rulers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The Holy Alliance was designed to
propagate Christian principles across the continent and annihilate republican governments.
Unlike its counterpart the Quadruple Alliance, the Holy Alliance was ideologically driven. Given
that Castlereagh already saw Tsar Alexander as a candidate for the next Napoleon at Vienna, it
should be no wonder why Castlereagh was suspicious of Alexander leading a powerful,
ideologically driven military force as Napoleon once had. By 1818, the nature of the European
system was already called into question. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, diplomats from
Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia met to discuss the state of France in the three years
since the Congress of Vienna. While the focus was intended to be on French reparations and the
end of its military occupation, discussion also included the relationship among the five powers.
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This discussion led to the creation of the Quintuple Alliance and further conversations
over its jurisdiction. The most relevant matters were the ongoing revolutions in South America.
Since 1808, Spain’s colonial empire had been crumbling as its colonies were caught up in radical
fervor. By 1818, Spain had specifically requested that the other major powers of Europe give
their support in suppressing the rebellions, and France and Russia were likely to oblige. 10
Castlereagh himself was against intervention in South America. By 1818, the threat of radicalism
had subsided to the other side of the Atlantic and Castlereagh was not as concerned with it as it
was not a direct threat to Britain. He was far less concerned with South American radicalism
spreading to Europe than he was with Russian influence spreading as far as the Americas.
Castlereagh saw Tsar Alexander as a possible new source of European radicalism after
Napoleon. Therefore, in this instance he decided to allow one distant bed of radicalism to live so
that another could not grow in power. One must note that at this point, Castlereagh did not
believe that South American republicanism was at risk of spreading across the Atlantic.
As he would go on to do in 1820, Castlereagh established clear evidence for his position
at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. He was very particular to note that Britain’s cause for being a
member of the Alliance was to preserve the settlement that came out of the Congress of Vienna.
As John Bew writes:
…this was a long way from a general guarantee and only applied to France… Britain was
bound to protect the territorial settlement at Vienna for twenty years, but she had never
agreed to interfere in, or act as the guarantor of, any specific form of government within
an independent state. Even in the case of France, the allies could only intervene if they
considered ‘their own safety compromised.’ 11
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One can already see similarities and differences between this sentiment and the State Paper of
May 5th, 1820. In both instances, Castlereagh cited the purpose of the Alliance as a primary
reason for nonintervention, but he only cited public opinion in the State Paper.
Castlereagh also made no specific reference to radicalism in 1818. At Aix-la-Chapelle,
the issue on the table was the jurisdiction and basic principles of the alliance, not whether the
threat was of a high enough degree to warrant their involvement. Once again, this is a marked
shift away from Castlereagh’s previous resolve with regards to radicalism. Even though he said
that Spanish republicanism was not a threat in the State Paper, the fact that he felt the need to
mention radicalism at all is a notable change. Additionally, on May 6 th, 1820, the day after
issuing the State Paper, Castlereagh wrote a letter to Metternich in which he remarked that:
…although we have made immense progress against Radicalism, the monster still lives,
and shows himself in new shapes; but we do not despair of crushing him by time and
perseverance. The laws have been reinforced, but the juries do their duty, and wherever
the mischief in its labyrinth breaks forth, it presents little real danger, 12
This sentiment was in line with what he expressed in the State Paper the previous day. While
radicalism was certainly a threat, it was contained.
Castlereagh’s attitude towards intervention reflected that of his peers in Lord Liverpool’s
cabinet, such as George Canning and the Duke of Wellington. Liverpool himself held similar
views towards international relations as Castlereagh. He was the one who allowed Castlereagh to
operate at the Congress of Vienna and approved the Secret Treaty with Austria and France. The
Duke of Wellington, a personal friend of Castlereagh’s, also held the belief that Britain should
distance itself from the continent. As he commented to Prince Esterhazy of Austria, “The British
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cabinet wishes the Alliance sleep.” 13 Similarly, George Canning continued much of
Castlereagh’s foreign policy decisions when he succeeded him as Foreign Secretary in 1822,
including a policy of noninterventionism. Canning even cited the State Paper of May 5 th, 1820 as
a primary influence in his own foreign policy decisions.
By 1821, the threat of radicalism had spread across Mediterranean Europe. It began
quietly in late 1820 when a rebellion broke out in Sicily and Naples. This was not a republican
revolution akin to those of France and Spain; the rebels only desired a constitutional monarchy,
not a full republic. Castlereagh believed that the revolution did not require the intervention of the
Quintuple Alliance, saying that it was unnecessary “when danger springs from the internal
convulsions of independent States…”14 He also hoped that the Alliance would make its decisions
“upon the particular case, without hazarding general declarations, containing universal pledges
that cannot be redeemed…”15 The threat was purely domestic, so it was of no threat to Britain
and therefore did not need intervention. However, his allies disagreed and after the Congress of
Troppau the Holy Alliance intervened, having declared their universal pledge to annihilate
revolutionary governments.
On February 21, 1821, the Greek War of Independence began. This revolution was
republican in nature; in 1822 it even established the “First Hellenic Republic,” using the same
style of name as the First French Republic. Once again, the geopolitical situation of Europe
posed the question of intervention to the major powers. Over the course of 1821, Castlereagh
wrote two letters directed to Tsar Alexander, urging him not to intervene in Greece. On the
surface, this may appear to be an instance of Castlereagh having no fear of radicalism, but the
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precise arguments he used to convince Alexander say otherwise. Additionally, one must consider
that Alexander remained the person Castlereagh saw as the most likely candidate to become the
next Napoleon.
In the first letter, which was written on July 16, Castlereagh argued that Russia should
not intervene in the Greek War of Independence. 16 This letter contained similar sentiments to
those Castlereagh presented on May 5 and 6, 1820 and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. He
said that Russia was of no risk of falling victim to the revolution, as long as they amassed
soldiers on their border, and that a military occupation of Greece would be unwise. The warning
to amass soldiers on the Greco-Russian border is noteworthy because it suggests that Castlereagh
believed that the Greek revolutionaries would attempt an invasion of Russia. This is a change
from 1820 when he believed that Spanish republicans would make no attempt at invasion. While
it could be argued that Castlereagh was actually trying to coerce Alexander into an invasion by
moving his army to the border, this does not fit with Castlereagh’s subsequent request for nonintervention. It was more important to convince Tsar Alexander to not exert further influence
than it was to stop an ongoing revolution.
The second letter, which was written on December 14, had a much different approach.
This letter was not addressed to Tsar Alexander but to Charles Bagot, the British ambassador to
Russia. Though its message was intended for the Tsar, it was a private letter that Castlereagh
explicitly “[did] not wish to enter officially.” 17 Once again, he urged the Tsar not to intervene in
Greece, but instead of focusing on precise disadvantages he emphasized general principles.
Castlereagh described the revolution in Greece as “in no respect distinguishable from the
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movements which have preceded it in Spain, Portugal, and Italy” except in that it was connected
to the Ottomans.18 Utilizing flowery imagery, he illustrated that “it is impossible that the
Emperor should not see that the head of this revolutionary torrent is in Greece, that the tide is
flowing in upon his southern provinces in almost an uninterrupted and continuous stream from
the other side of the Atlantic.”19 There is a change in opinion between this last point and
Castlereagh’s opinion in 1818. At Aix-la-Chapelle, Castlereagh believed that South American
republicanism could not spread to Europe. In 1821, it was the source of a movement that had
spread across the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally, Castlereagh once again stated that Russia must
be defensive with regards to Greek republicanism. He claimed that Russian intervention would
only aggravate an already volatile situation and risk spreading radical ideals through the Russian
army should it occupy Greece.
One might assume that this letter was an instance of Castlereagh using manipulative
tactics to secure his desired outcome, but this assumption is contrary to his reputation as a
diplomat. In this cynical version of events, Castlereagh recognized that his logistical argument in
July was ineffective, so he switched to the tactic of exaggerating his fears of a spreading Greek
Revolution to convince Alexander. However, as Kissinger so wrote, Castlereagh’s diplomatic
style was “solid, ponderous, pragmatic, …, matter of fact and direct.” 20 He had a “reputation for
integrity, consistency, and goodwill, which was perhaps unmatched by any diplomat of [this]
era.” For Castlereagh to have engaged in such manipulative tactics would have been a sudden
departure from decades of straightforward diplomacy.
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Castlereagh had regained the fear of republicanism he once held. While he did touch on
the fact that Russian intervention in Greece would bring the Tsar into conflict with the Ottoman
Empire, the driving force in this letter was the broad issue of the spread of radicalism. He even
specified that, in any other case, the Tsar should have intervened, but it was only due to the
precise problems in this instance that they needed to refrain. 21 In particular, a Russian invasion of
Greece would have brought Alexander into conflict with the Sultan, thus distracting both parties
from suppressing the rebellion. He also noted that the Tsar needed to wait to air his grievances
with the Sultan until after the revolution had been suppressed as the mere possibility of
distracting the Sultan from stopping the rebellion was too great a risk. 22 He wrote that Russian
intervention would only risk “fostering revolutionary principles.” 23 While both of these letters
come to the conclusion that Russian intervention in Greece would be a mistake, the later one was
far more concerned with the threat of republicanism than the earlier letter. Therefore,
Castlereagh was much more driven by that personal motivation in 1821, as he was in 1800 and
1815, than he was in 1820.
In 1820, with the direct threat of republican revolution firmly behind him, Castlereagh
could at last look away from his personal motivations and towards the world around him when
constructing his diplomacy. As seen in his newfound concern for public opinion, his emphasis on
specific diplomatic issues and not broad principles when dealing with Russia, and the opinions of
his close peers, Castlereagh reflected the situation of his day in 1820. However, by 1821, the
spread of radicalism from Spain to Italy and Greece led Castlereagh to once again become

21

The Marquess of Londonderry to Sir Charles Bagot, December 14, 1821, Memoirs and Correspondence of
Viscount Castlereagh, Volume 12.
22
The Marquess of Londonderry to Sir Charles Bagot, December 14, 1821, Memoirs and Correspondence of
Viscount Castlereagh, Volume 12.
23
The Marquess of Londonderry to Sir Charles Bagot, December 14, 1821, Memoirs and Correspondence of
Viscount Castlereagh, Volume 12.

44

fearful of the ideology that had already influenced so much of his legacy, as seen in the changing
motivations behind his foreign policy.
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Conclusion
Over the course of his diplomatic career, Viscount Castlereagh was motivated by a
personal aversion to radicalism. With the Act of Union of 1800, he aimed to protect his
homeland from French radicalism by bringing it directly under British sovereignty. At the
Congress of Vienna, he strove to protect Britain from radicalism, past and future, by working to
ensure the old sources stayed down and that what he saw as the new sources were limited in their
aims. In the post-Napoleonic period, radicalism had subsided as a direct threat to Britain,
allowing Castlereagh to take issues such as public opinion into consideration when deciding his
foreign policy. This anti-radical motivation gave rise to the traditional perspective on
Castlereagh: Bloody Castlereagh who crushed the Irish Rebellion of 1798, was one of the
faceless diplomats who repressed all of the peoples of Europe at Vienna, and became the Mask
of Murder who stained Peterloo red.
No matter Castlereagh’s personal motivations and desires, geopolitics dictated that
sacrifices and compromises were required if Britain’s security were to be ensured. In 1800, he
sacrificed Catholic emancipation to secure the defense of Ireland. In 1815, he allowed Russia and
Prussia to gain territory and influence to reach a greater agreement at Vienna. In the postNapoleonic period, he saw nonintervention as the ideal method for maintaining British security,
no matter how much he personally disliked foreign radical movements. These pragmatic
decisions led to the modern perspective on Castlereagh: the insular chess master who did
whatever was necessary to ensure his goal of British security.
However, neither perspective exists in a vacuum. Both views are grounded in the idea
that the other is incorrect, but, in fact, both of them are true in their own way. Castlereagh
sacrificed Catholic emancipation because he saw defending against radicalism as being of greater
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importance. While he ultimately allowed Russia and Prussia to expand, he fought against it for as
long as he could. Even though he instituted nonintervention as official policy, his arguments for
this policy changed alongside the recurrence of radicalism across the Mediterranean. The modern
perspective illustrates Castlereagh’s actions, but the traditional perspective emphasizes his
motivations. To have a full understanding of who Castlereagh was as a diplomat, one must
understand both.
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